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It is known that the financial statement audit represents the corporate governance 
mechanism crucial for ensuring the appropriate quality of the financial reporting 
process and financial statements. One of the most significant aspects of the financial 
statement audit process is the application of the materiality concept. Auditors apply 
the concept in planning and performing the process, as well as in evaluating the effects 
of identified misstatements. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) de-
fines that the information provided in financial statements is material if could reason-
ably be expected that will influence the business decisions of the stakeholders. Although 
not mandatory, recent Standards and regulation changes resulted in reporting mate-
riality details by a significant number of auditors in Croatia. The research question is 
how that practice develops from the implementation year, 2016, to nowadays, 2020, 
and what can be expected in the future. Following the research problem, the objective 
of the paper will be to investigate the current state and future perspective of disclosing 
information regarding materiality in the independent auditor’s report in Croatia. To 
investigate the research problem, we analyzed independent auditor’s reports of Croa-
tian listed companies (public interest entities - PIEs) from 2016 to 2019. The research 
is conducted by applying appropriate statistical methodology as descriptive statistics, 
cluster analysis, and non-parametric tests, and regression analysis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Managing business operations in a contemporary, dynamic, chaotic, and un-
stable environment is extremely challenging. That is especially emphasized 
for the largest companies, as public-interest entities (PIEs) characterized by 
different stakeholders, higher visibility and public interest, and great economic 
impact. European legislation defines public-interest entities as the ones whose 
transferable securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market of any 
European Union state, including credit institutions, insurance undertakings.1 
Croatian Accounting Act, which is harmonized with European legislations, 
next to quoted companies, credit institutions and insurance undertakings, as 
public-interest entities classifies a wide range of other financial institutions 
(for example, investment funds, leasing-companies, re-insurance companies, 
factoring companies, pension funds), legal entities of special interest for the 
Republic of Croatia, entities that employ more than 5000 employees, or the 
one that has a total asset greater than 5 billion HRK, and others.2 The latter 
is subject to a joint audit under the Audit Act.3 Business operations and man-
agement processes in those entities are complex, more regulated, and assume 
branched organizational structure, with a multilevel chain of command with a 
different range of responsibilities. Additionally, shareholders are most proba-
bly not included in the managing process. Nevertheless, they expect adequate 
results aligned with the mission, vision, and strategic objectives of the entity. 
They are usually represented by the supervisory board, which is the body that 
serves as guardians and promotors of shareholders’ interests. From the theoret-
ical point of view, the management interests on the one side, and shareholders 
on the other, is known as an agency theory. Undoubtedly, the interest of agents 
(management) and principles (stockholders) should be harmonized and direct-
ed to the long-term prosperity, growth, and development of the company. Nev-
ertheless, in certain circumstances, their interest may differ. The crucial role 
in aligning their expectations and interests has different corporate governance 
mechanisms. Corporate governance covers multidimensional aspects of man-
aging the business operations of the company to reconcile differences caused 
1 Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated ac-
counts, 13. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0056], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020.
2 Accounting Act, (Official Gazette number 78/2015, 134/2015, 120/2016, 116/2018, 42/2020, 
47/2020), Article 3, [https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2007_10_109_3174.html], 
accessed on 04/11/2020.
3 Audit Act, (Official Gazette number 127/2017), Article 43, [https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/
clanci/sluzbeni/2017_12_127_2873.html], accessed on 04/11/2020.
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by theory agency. Following the OECD, the role of corporate governance is 
to ensure an environment of trust, followed by a transparent and accountable 
management process aimed to foster financial stability and business integri-
ty.4 The Foundation of corporate governance are principles divided into six 
chapters. As a result of extensive empirical and analytical research related to 
the emerging trends, especially in the financial and corporate sector, then in 
technology and cybersecurity, in 2015, the OECD issued updated principles.
To measure business performance and strategic objectives achievement, or to 
assess if the company meets expected returns for the shareholders, financial 
data available from the accounting information system is used. For the exter-
nal stakeholders, necessary financial data is available from annual or quarterly 
financial statements. The output information is valuable as a quality of the 
input data. Managers are responsible to ensure the application of adequate 
measurement, presentation, derecognition, and disclosure of accounting con-
cepts. In the case of European and Croatian public-interest entities, the finan-
cial reporting framework is prescribed by International Financial Reporting 
Standards. The objective of financial reporting is to provide useful information 
to existing and potential stakeholders. “If financial information is to be useful, 
it must be relevant and faithfully represent what it purports to represent. The 
usefulness of financial information is enhanced if it is comparable, verifiable, 
timely and understandable.”5 Qualitative characteristics of useful informa-
tion are relevance and faithful representation. An important aspect of under-
standing the usefulness of information has a materiality concept. As it can 
be concluded, financial information presented in financial statements have an 
irreplaceable role for all stakeholders, and in that context, it is crucial that the 
information is fairly and objectively presented. The fifth corporate governance 
principle promotes disclosure and transparency. The corporate governance 
framework should “ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company”.6 According to the 
principles, corporate governance mechanisms have a crucial role in ensuring 
4 OECD: G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015, [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.
org/governance/g20-oecd-principles-of-corporate-governance-2015_9789264236882-en;jses-
sionid=nK8BfisYg9Rg0tEv2ekV330z.ip-10-240-5-39], accessed on 04/11/2020.
5 IASB: IFRS Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, 2018, p. 14, [https://incp.org.
co/Site/publicaciones/info/archivos/Conceptual-Framework-2018-03042018.pdf], accessed on 
04/11/2020.
6 OECD: G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015, p. 37, [https://
www.oecd-i l ibra ry.org /governance/g20-oecd-pr inciples-of-cor porate-govern-
ance-2015_9789264236882-en;jsessionid=nK8BfisYg9Rg0tEv2ekV330z.ip-10-240-5-39], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020.
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high-quality financial information. The most important corporate governance 
mechanisms in the execution of those responsibilities are audit committee, 
internal auditors, and independent statutory auditors. By the second principle, 
it is emphasized that shareholder should have the opportunity to ask questions 
to the board relating to the annual external audit.7
The audit committee is a specialized sub-board of the supervisory board 
formed to “help to minimize financial, operational and compliance risks, and 
enhance the quality of financial reporting.”8 On the other hand, the most im-
portant role in assuring that financial statements present fair and objective 
information have independent statutory auditors. External auditors have an ir-
replaceable role in providing objective assurance to the board and shareholders 
that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and perfor-
mance of the company in all material respects.9 The role of the audit commit-
tee is to monitor the financial reporting process and review and monitor the 
auditors’ independence and in particular the provision of additional, especially 
non-audit services to the company.10 On the other side, external auditors have 
to ensure independence and use appropriate levels of professional competence 
and skepticism in their activities. “External auditors should be accountable to 
the shareholders and owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional 
care in the conduct of the audit.”11 External auditors should adhere to the high-
est ethical standards by employing integrity, objectivity, professional compe-
tence, and due care. European and, accordingly Croatian, legislation prescribes 
7 OECD: G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015, p. 21, [https://
www.oecd-i l ibra ry.org /governance/g20-oecd-pr inciples-of-cor porate-govern-
ance-2015_9789264236882-en;jsessionid=nK8BfisYg9Rg0tEv2ekV330z.ip-10-240-5-39], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020.
8 Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated ac-
counts, 24. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0056], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020
9 OECD: G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015, p. 43, [https://
www.oecd-i l ibra ry.org /governance/g20-oecd-pr inciples-of-cor porate-govern-
ance-2015_9789264236882-en;jsessionid=nK8BfisYg9Rg0tEv2ekV330z.ip-10-240-5-39], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020.
10 Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated ac-
counts, 39 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0056], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020
11 OECD: G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015, p. 44, [https://




Boris Tušek, Ana Ježovita: Trends on reporting materiality information in the independent auditor’s report...
that public-interest entities shall have an audit committee and that at least one 
member of the committee shall be independent and shall have competence 
in accounting and/or auditing.12 The audit committee has the most extensive 
communication with companies’ internal auditors and statutory auditors. Both 
of them have responsibilities to report their activities, findings, and results to 
the audit committee. Related to the financial reporting process, statutory au-
ditors “shall report to the audit committee on key matters arising from the 
statutory audit, and in particular on material weaknesses in internal control in 
relation to the financial reporting process”.13
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
Considering the importance of the public-interest entities for an economy of 
the country and a large number of interested parties, financial statement au-
dits in European Union for those entities are specially regulated with a wide 
range of requests and legislation constraints. In that context, financial state-
ment audits are known as statutory audits, and they are conducted by statutory 
auditors. “Statutory auditors and audit firms are entrusted by law to conduct 
statutory audits of public-interest entities with a view to enhancing the degree 
of confidence of the public in the annual and consolidated financial statements 
of such entities.”14 In general, statutory audit is “an audit of annual accounts or 
consolidated accounts insofar as required by Community law”.15 The purpose 
of an audit of financial statements is to “enhance the degree of confidence 
of intended users in the financial statements” by expressing an opinion by 
12 Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consol-
idated accounts, Article 39, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex-
%3A32014L0056], accessed on 04/11/2020
13 Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consol-
idated accounts, Article 39, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex-
%3A32014L0056], accessed on 04/11/2020
14 Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-in-
terest entities and repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC, 1, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0537], accessed on 04/11/2020.
15 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 
on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Direc-
tives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC, Article 2, 
[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32006L0043], accessed on 
04/11/2020.
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the independent auditor (professional accountant) on “whether the financial 
statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an ap-
plicable financial reporting framework”, i.e. “whether the financial statements 
are presented fairly, in all material respects, or give a true and fair view in 
accordance with the framework”.16 The financial reporting framework pre-
scribed for European and Croatian public-interest entities is the International 
Financial Reporting Standards. Statutory audits in European Union must be 
carried out in compliance with international auditing standards adopted by 
the Commission, where international auditing standards mean International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA) and related Statements and Standards, insofar as 
relevant to the statutory audit.17 The results of statutory audits are presented in 
an audit report, i.e. independent auditor’s report. As it was stated earlier, Croa-
tian legislation is harmonized with European, and in that context, the Croatian 
Audit Act prescribes that an audit report is a report of the independent auditor 
prepared in compliance with International Standards on Auditing (ISA).18 The 
most relevant part of the independent auditor’s report is an auditor’s opinion 
about the fair and objective presentation of financial position, business perfor-
mance, and cash flows in financial statements in all material respects under the 
International Financial Reporting Standards. The opinion formed by the audi-
tor is useful and relevant if an audit is conducted following ISAs and relevant 
ethical requirements.19
Foundation of audit activity is obtaining “reasonable assurance about wheth-
er the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, 
whether due to fraud or error”.20 The ISA defines misstatements as “a between 
16 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 200, 3, p. 73,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
17 Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated ac-
counts, Article 2 and Article 26, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex-
%3A32014L0056], accessed on 04/11/2020
18 Audit Act, (Official Gazette number 127/2017), Article 4, [https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/
clanci/sluzbeni/2017_12_127_2873.html], accessed on 04/11/2020.
19 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 200, 4, p. 73,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
20 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 200, 5, p. 74,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
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the amount, classification, presentation, or disclosure of a reported financial 
statement item and the amount, classification, presentation, or disclosure that is 
required for the item to be in accordance with the applicable financial report-
ing framework. Misstatements can arise from error or fraud.”21 In the context 
of the auditor’s opinion, misstatements also include adjustments necessary for 
the financial statements to be presented fairly, in all material respects. Nev-
ertheless, auditors do not obtain absolute, but they obtain reasonable assur-
ance (high level of assurance), “because there are inherent limitations of an 
audit which result in most of the audit evidence on which the auditor draws 
conclusions and bases the auditor’s opinion being persuasive rather than con-
clusive”.22 “The auditor obtains reasonable assurance by obtaining sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence to reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level.”23 
“The phrase obtain reasonable assurance is intended to inform users that audi-
tors do not guarantee or ensure the fair presentation of the financial statements. 
Some risk that the financial statements are not fairly stated exists, even when 
the opinion is unmodified.”24 Quantitatively speaking, the level of risk is de-
termined by the percentage of acceptable audit risk. Considering that auditors 
obtain reasonable assurance, they have to apply the concept of materiality in 
their activities. “In general, misstatements, including omissions, are consid-
ered to be material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably 
be expected to influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis 
of the financial statements.”25 “The phrase free of material misstatement is 
intended to inform users that the auditor’s responsibility is limited to mate-
rial financial information. Materiality is important because it is impractical 
21 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, p. 26,  [https://www.ifac.org/
system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_Web.pdf], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020.
22 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, p. 26,  [https://www.ifac.org/
system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_Web.pdf], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020.
23 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, A1, p. 317,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
24 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 262.
25 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 200, 6, p. 74,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
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for auditors to provide assurances on immaterial amounts.”26 The concept of 
materiality arises from the financial reporting framework. The International 
Financial Reporting Standards define materiality as “an entity-specific aspect 
of relevance based on the nature or magnitude, or both, of the items to which 
the information relates in the context of an individual entity’s financial report. 
Consequently, the Board cannot specify a uniform quantitative threshold for 
materiality or predetermine what could be material in a particular situation.”27 
Further to this, the ISAs state that auditor is making judgments about ma-
teriality, in the light of surrounding circumstances, and are affected by the 
auditor’s perception of the financial information needs of users of the financial 
statements, and by the size or nature of a misstatement, or a combination of 
both. (…) “The auditor is not responsible for the detection of misstatements 
that are not material to the financial statements as a whole.”28 In that context, 
auditors determine tolerable misstatement which is “a monetary amount set 
by the auditor in respect of which the auditor seeks to obtain an appropriate 
level of assurance that the monetary amount set by the auditor is not exceeded 
by the actual misstatement in the population.”29 The risk that the amount of 
tolerable misstatement is exceeded before the audit is a risk of material mis-
statement, which consists of two components, inherent risk and control risk. To 
minimize the risk of material misstatements and to obtain reasonable assur-
ance that financial statements are free from material misstatements, auditors in 
their activities must exercise professional judgment and maintain professional 
skepticism. Professional judgment assumes “application of relevant training, 
knowledge and experience, within the context provided by auditing, account-
ing and ethical standards, in making informed decisions about the courses of 
action that are appropriate in the circumstances of the audit engagement”.30 
26 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 262.
27 IASB: IFRS Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, 2018, p. 15, [https://incp.org.
co/Site/publicaciones/info/archivos/Conceptual-Framework-2018-03042018.pdf], accessed on 
04/11/2020.
28 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 200, 6, p. 74,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
29 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, p. 36,  [https://www.ifac.org/
system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_Web.pdf], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020.
30 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, p. 29,  [https://www.ifac.org/
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Professional judgment is obtained by experience. On the other hand, profes-
sional skepticism is “an attitude that includes a questioning mind, being alert 
to conditions which may indicate possible misstatement due to error or fraud, 
and a critical assessment of evidence”.31 “Professional skepticism an attitude 
that includes a questioning mind, being alert to conditions that may indicate 
possible misstatement due to fraud or error, and a critical assessment of audit 
evidence.”32
Materiality is a key auditing concept that is first assessed during the risk as-
sessment phase of every audit.33 ISA 320 Materiality in planning and per-
forming an audit deals with the auditor’s responsibility to apply the concept of 
materiality in planning and performing an audit of financial statements, and 
ISA 450 Evaluation of Misstatements identified during the Audit explains how 
materiality is applied in evaluating the effect of identified misstatements on the 
audit and of uncorrected misstatements, if any, on the financial statements. Al-
though, it may seem that determining materiality is a fairly simple activity, it 
is by no means such. “The auditor’s determination of materiality is a matter of 
professional judgment, and is affected by the auditor’s perception of the finan-
cial information needs of users of the financial statements.”34 In that context it 
is expected from the users of financial statements that they possess reasonable 
knowledge of business and economic activities and accounting; understand 
that financial statements are prepared, presented and audited to levels of ma-
teriality; recognize the uncertainties inherent in the measurement of amounts 
based on the use of estimates, judgment and the consideration of future events; 




31 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, p. 30,  [https://www.ifac.org/
system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_Web.pdf], ac-
cessed on 04/11/2020.
32 Johnson, R. N.; Wiley, L. D.:Auditing: A Practical Approach with Data Analytics, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2019, p. 3-15.
33 Johnson, R. N.; Wiley, L. D.:Auditing: A Practical Approach with Data Analytics, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2019, p. 3-11.
34 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, 4, p. 314-315,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
35 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, 4, p. 315,  [https://
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Auditors apply materiality concept both in planning and performing the audit 
as well in evaluating the effects of identified misstatements on the audit and of 
uncorrected misstatements. The first phase concerning materiality is in planning 
the engagement where auditor makes judgments about the size of misstatements 
that will be considered material. These judgments provide a basis for: determin-
ing the nature, timing and extent of risk assessment procedures; identifying and 
assessing the risks of material misstatement; and determining the nature, timing 
and extent of further audit procedures.36 The materiality determined when plan-
ning the engagement “does not necessarily establish an amount below which un-
corrected misstatements”.37 New insights and findings during the performing of 
engagement may result in re-evaluating the acceptable levels of materiality and 
risk of tolerable misstatement, which leads to re-assessing the needed amount of 
audit evidence for forming an opinion. “The auditor shall revise materiality for 
the financial statements as a whole (and, if applicable, the materiality level or lev-
els for particular classes of transactions, account balances or disclosures) in the 
event of becoming aware of information during the audit that would have caused 
the auditor to have determined a different amount (or amounts) initially.”38
To reduce audit risk, auditors should determine the level of performance mate-
riality, which represents “the amount or amounts set by the auditor at less than 
materiality for the financial statements as a whole to reduce to an appropriately 
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
36 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, 6, p. 315,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
37 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, 6, p. 315,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
38 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, 12, p. 316,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
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28 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, and Related Services 
Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 200, 6, p. 74,  
[https://www.ifac.org/ ystem/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_W b.pdf], 
accessed on 04/11/2020. 
29 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, and Related Services 
Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, p. 36,  
[https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_Web.pdf], 
accessed on 04/11/2020. 
30 IAASB: Handbook of Internati nal Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, and Related Services 
Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, p. 29,  
[https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_Web.pdf], 
accessed on 04/11/2020. 
31 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, and Related Services 
Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, p. 30,  
[https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_Web.pdf], 
accessed on 04/11/2020. 
32 Johnson, R. N.; Wiley, L. D.:Auditing: A Practical Approach with Data Analytics, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2019, p. 3-15. 
Audit Risk 
Tolerable 














Boris Tušek, Ana Ježovita: Trends on reporting materiality information in the independent auditor’s report...
low level the probability that the aggregate of uncorrected and undetected mis-
statements exceeds materiality for the financial statements as a whole”.39 Au-
ditors determine performance materiality “for purposes of assessing the risks 
of material misstatement and determining the nature, timing and extent of fur-
ther audit procedures.”40 “Performance materiality is an amount set by the au-
ditor that is less than planning materiality and is used to make decisions about 
the extent of audit procedures for a particular class of transaction, account 
balance, or disclosure.”41 According to Arens (2016) performance materiality 
helps auditors to decide the appropriate audit evidence to accumulate, where 
the performance materiality is inversely related to the sample size, i.e. the 
amount of evidence that should be gathered.42 “The determination of perfor-
mance materiality is based on professional judgment and reflects the amount 
of misstatement an auditor is willing to accept in a particular segment.”43 Per-
formance materiality actually represents tolerable misstatements.44 “Auditors 
accept some level of risk or uncertainty in performing the audit function. The 
auditor recognizes, for example, the inherent uncertainty about the appropri-
ateness of evidence, uncertainty about the effectiveness of a client’s internal 
controls, and uncertainty about whether the financial statements are fairly 
stated when the audit is completed. An effective auditor recognizes that risks 
exist and deals with those risks in an appropriate manner. Most risks auditors 
encounter are difficult to measure and require careful consideration before the 
auditor can respond appropriately. Because the assessment of risks is a matter 
of professional judgment, rather than a precise measurement, responding to 
these risks properly is critical to achieving a high-quality audit.”45
39 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, 9, p. 316,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
40 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, 11, p. 316,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
41 Johnson, R. N.; Wiley, L. D.:Auditing: A Practical Approach with Data Analytics, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2019, p. 3-13.
42 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017.
43 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 239.
44 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 239.
45 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 262.
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On the other side, “audit risk is the risk that the auditor expresses an inappro-
priate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated. 
Audit risk is a function of the risks of material misstatement and detection 
risk”.46 In planning audit engagements auditors determine acceptable level of 
audit risk, expressed as percentage. “Acceptable audit risk is a measure of how 
willing the auditor is to accept that the financial statements may be materially 
misstated after the audit is completed and an unmodified opinion has been 
issued.”47 The practical interpretation of the level of acceptable audit risk is 
narrowly related with statistics. For example, if auditor accepts overall audit 
risk at the level of 5% that means that he issues an opinion with 95% certain-
ty that there are no material misstatements in the financial statements. Fur-
thermore, it is practically unfeasible to issue an opinion with 100% certainty, 
i.e. absolute assurance, considering cost-benefit effects, and time, human and 
financial resources limitations. But, contemporary information-technology de-
velopment and digitalization processes, incorporated in continuous auditing, 
open possibility for auditors to issue absolute, instead of reasonable assurance. 
“In future, with technological advances, the importance of materiality may re-
duce as companies and their auditors become able to more cost-effectively, and 
accurately, interrogate and adjust financial information. However, this is not 
yet the case.”48 “Often, auditors refer to the term audit assurance (also called 
overall assurance or level of assurance) instead of acceptable audit risk. Audit 
assurance or any of the equivalent terms is the complement of acceptable audit 
risk, that is, one minus acceptable audit risk. In other words, acceptable audit 
risk of 2 percent is the same as audit assurance of 98 percent.”49
Audit risk is a function of the risk of material misstatement and the detection 
risk. While the detection is actually the risk of the auditor that he will not de-
tect material misstatements by conducting audit activities, the risk of material 
misstatement on the other side is a function of inherent and control risks, where 
the inherent risk is a function of fraud and business risks. “The risk of material 
misstatement is the risk that the financial statements contain a material misstate-
46 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, A1, p. 317,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
47 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 272.
48 Financial Reporting Council: Audit Quality Thematic Review: Materiality, 2017, p. 4, 
[https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/4713123b-919c-4ed6-a7a4-869aa9a668f4/Audit-Quali-
ty-Thematic-Review-Materiality-(December-2017).pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
49 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 272.
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ment due to fraud or error prior to the audit. The risk of material misstatement 
is a function of the susceptibility of the financial statements (as a whole or in in-
dividual accounts) to misstatement, and the effectiveness of the client’s controls 
in preventing or detecting and correcting the misstatements.”50 Auditors assess 
fraud and business risks in phase of obtaining understanding of the client, and 
control risk in preliminary controls testing. “When identifying accounts and re-
lated assertions at risk of material misstatement, some risks are classified as be-
ing more significant than others. A significant risk is an identified and assessed 
risk of material misstatement that, in the auditor’s judgment, requires special 
audit consideration.”51 “Using the audit risk model and performance materiality 
for each audit objective, the auditor determines the audit evidence needed to 
achieve an acceptable level of audit risk for the financial statements as a whole.52
How the auditor’s report should be read and where do we stand with 
information needed to understand what is behind an auditor’s opinion?
For example, if auditor has issued unmodified opinion, determined materiality 
level as 2% of total assets, that is 200.000 HRK (total asset is 10 million HRK), 
and acceptable audit risk is 5%. The independent audit statement should be in-
terpreted as follows: In our opinion, with certainty of 95%, the accompanying 
financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, not exceeding ma-
teriality of 200.000 HRK for financial statements as a whole, the financial po-
sition of X Company as at December 31, 20X1, and its financial performance 
and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). The non-underlined italic part of the 
sentence present formulation available from the auditor’s report, and under-
lined italic part present additional information that should be considered for 
obtaining overall, comprehensive conclusion, i.e. the big picture of conduced 
audit. As it can be concluded, the concepts of materiality and audit risk are mu-
tually conditioned, one measure uncertainty (audit risk) and other measure of 
magnitude or size of acceptable uncertainty (materiality). The information of 
acceptable audit risk, without a specific materiality measure, could imply that 
10.000 HRK or 1.000.000 HRK misstatements is acceptable, i.e. that auditor 
gives certain level of reasonable assurance (e.g. 95%) that financial statements 
as a whole are free from material misstatement in amount unknown to users 
50 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 222.
51 Johnson, R. N.; Wiley, L. D.:Auditing: A Practical Approach with Data Analytics, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2019, p. 3-16.
52 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 284.
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of financial statements. On the other side, available information on materiality, 
without information on audit risk, does not provide users with complete in-
formation. It is not the same if acceptable material misstatements of 200.000 
HRK in case when the level of reasonable assurance is 40% or 95%.
Expectation and Information Gaps
As it can be concluded the statutory auditors have irreparable role in providing 
reliable and creditable opinion on fair and objective presentation of financial 
statements of the company. “The external audit plays an important role in sup-
porting the quality of financial reporting around the world, whether in the con-
text of the capital markets, the public sector or the private or non-public sector. 
It is an essential part of the regulatory and supervisory infrastructure.”53 Au-
ditor’s reporting plays an important role in communication with stakeholders, 
and by that in 2011 IAASB (standard-setting body) started a process of revi-
sion of the reporting ISAs with the objective to increase informative value of 
the independent auditor’s report. “Users recognize there is richer information 
about the entity and about the audit itself than is currently being provided 
through the audited financial statements and other corporate disclosure mech-
anisms, and through the auditor‘s report. Users wish to obtain this richer in-
formation directly from the entity and/or through communications about the 
auditor‘s insight into such matters. They believe such information would assist 
them in assessing the financial condition and performance of the entity, as 
well as the quality of its corporate reporting and the quality of the audit.”54 
This difference “between what users expect from the auditor and the financial 
statement audit, and the reality of what an audit is” is known as expectations 
gap.55 As stakeholders are aware that there is much more activities in auditing 
engagements than publicly presented, they expect and believe that auditor’s 
report must be more informative, and include additional information that im-
pacted auditors in issuing opinions, but only unified sentence whether financial 
statements give fair and objective presentation of financial position, business 
performance and cash flows. “Users of corporate financial information point to 
53 IAASB: Enhancing the Value of Auditor Reporting, Consultation Paper, 2011, p. 6, [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/exposure-drafts/CP_Auditor_Reporting-Final.pdf], 
accessed on 11/11/2020.
54 IAASB: Enhancing the Value of Auditor Reporting, Consultation Paper, 2011, p. 7, [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/exposure-drafts/CP_Auditor_Reporting-Final.pdf], 
accessed on 11/11/2020.
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the existence of a gap between the information they believe is needed to make 
informed investment and fiduciary decisions, and what is available to them 
through the entity‘s audited financial statements or other publicly available 
information. This ‘information gap’ has implications for the efficiency of capi-
tal markets and the cost of capital.”56 The IAASB believes that by enhancing 
the structure and content of individual auditor’s report, the information gap 
will be narrowed and the integrity, reliability and credibility of the report will 
increase. In 2016 the Board issued five revised (ISA 700 (Revised) Forming 
an Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements, ISA 260 (Revised) Com-
munication with Those Charged with Governance, ISA 570 (Revised) Going 
Concern, ISA 705 (Revised) Modifications to the Opinion in the Independent 
Auditor’s Report, and ISA 706 (Revised) Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs and 
Other Matter Paragraphs in the Independent Auditor’s Report) and one com-
pletely new reporting standard (ISA 701 Communicating Key Audit Matters 
in the Independent Auditor’s Report). The changes significantly upgraded the 
way auditors report results of conducted audit engagements. Despite signifi-
cant changes, certain discussed issues are not cover in final proposals. For ex-
ample, obligation to report applied materiality details. Among other questions 
and emphasized issues, auditor commentary on matters significant to users’ 
understanding of the audit or the audited financial statements, which would 
provide increased information about the audit, is that users have suggested 
that it would be helpful for information to be provided about the level of ma-
teriality applied by the auditor to perform the audit.57 But they also highlight 
that is not sufficient to only specify materiality thresholds used by the auditors 
without explanation of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the concept 
of materiality and how it is applied in the audit. Then, in Invitation to Com-
ment – Improving the Auditor’s Report, from 2012, on enhancing the infor-
mational value of the auditor’s report to assist in investment decision-making, 
users have varying reasons for seeking additional information, and appear to 
have different views about what may have the most value. In the context of 
materiality, “others would like to understand more about how the audit was 
conducted, and key judgments made by the auditor in planning the audit, such 
as materiality, the use of experts, or the involvement of other auditors”58. “A 
56 IAASB: Enhancing the Value of Auditor Reporting, Consultation Paper, 2011, p. 8, [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/exposure-drafts/CP_Auditor_Reporting-Final.pdf], 
accessed on 11/11/2020.
57 IAASB: Enhancing the Value of Auditor Reporting, Consultation Paper, 2011, p. 17, 
[https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/exposure-drafts/CP_Auditor_Reporting-Final.
pdf], accessed on 11/11/2020.
58 IAASB: Invitation to Comment – Improving the Auditor’s Report (ITC), 2012a, p. 21, 
[https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/Auditor_Reporting_Invitation_to_Com-
ment-final_0.pdf], accessed on 11/11/2020.
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minority of respondents would also like to know more about other ‘matters of 
audit significance’, for example matters of audit scope and strategy, including 
materiality, the use of experts and other auditors.”59 Finally, reporting detailed 
information about materiality is not requested by new and revised ISAs. 
So, where do we stand with the two most important concepts of the financial 
statement audits? 
Disclosing the information of the acceptable level of audit risk was not even put 
into the discussion, and disclosing materiality details, although discussed, was 
not included in the final version of new and revised reporting International Stan-
dards on Auditing. Nevertheless, although not mandatory, recent Standards and 
regulation changes resulted in reporting materiality details by a significant num-
ber of auditors in Croatia. In that context, the research question is how that prac-
tice develops from the implementation year, 2016, to nowadays, 2020, and what 
can be expected in the future. Following the research problem, the objective of 
the paper was to investigate the current state and future perspective of disclosing 
information regarding materiality in the independent auditor’s report in Croatia.
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1. IMPORTANCE OF MATERIALITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The materiality concept, in general, is important from the aspect of the overall 
financial reporting process and impacts the financial statement quality. There 
are a significant number of researchers who investigated the importance and 
the role of disclosing materiality information as a part of integrated report-
ing.60 Integrated reporting is a framework aimed to improve corporate gover-
59 IAASB: Auditor Reporting - Summary of Responses Relating to Auditor Commentary, 
2012b, p. 1, [https://www.iaasb.org/system/files/meetings/files/20121210-IAASB-Agenda_
Item_6A-AR_Auditor_Commentary-final_0.pdf], accessed on 08/11/2020.
60 Related research: Mio, C.; Fasan, M.; Costantini, A.: Materiality in integrated and sus-
tainability reporting: A paradigm shift? Business Strategy and the Environment, 29(1) 2020, 
https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2390; Cerbone, D.; Maroun, W.: Materiality in an integrated report-
ing setting: Insights using an institutional logics framework, The British Accounting Review, 
Elsevier, 52(3) 2020; 14. Green, W. J.; Cheng, M. M.: Materiality judgments in an integrated 
reporting setting: The effect of strategic relevance and strategy map, Accounting, Organiza-
tions and Society, Elsevier, 73(C) 2019, pp. 1-14; Gerwanski, J.; Kordsachia, O.; Velte, P.: De-
terminants of materiality disclosure quality in integrated reporting: Empirical evidence from 
an international setting, Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, 28(5) 2019, 
pp. 750-770; Bezverkhiy, K. V.: The Principle of Materiality and Its Practical Implementation 
in the Integrated Reporting of Corporate Enterprises, Naukovij Vìsnik Nacìonalʹnoï Akademìï 
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nance by applying principles focused on cohesion and efficiency to the report-
ing process “It improves the quality of information available to providers of 
financial capital to enable a more efficient and productive allocation of capital. 
Its focus on value creation, and the capitals used by the business to create val-
ue over time, contributes towards a more financially stable global economy.”61 
Guiding principles of the framework indicates that the integrated report should 
“disclose information about matters that substantively affect the organization’s 
ability to create value over the short, medium and long term”62. The integrated 
report is an unimaginably wider reporting concept compared to financial state-
ments. Next to the financial statements and auditor’s report, it covers strategic 
reports (organizational overview, business model, risks and opportunities, re-
source allocation, performance, outlook, basis of presentation) and corporate 
governance report, i.e. it covers information on internal and external business 
environment of the company. Reporting materiality, i.e. relevant matters in the 
integrated report is dominantly qualitative; it describes matters that influence 
making a business decision by stakeholders. As was stated earlier, materiality 
is defined by the financial reporting framework. “Materiality is an entity-spe-
cific aspect of relevance based on the nature or magnitude, or both, of the 
items to which the information relates in the context of an individual entity’s 
financial report.”63 Independent auditors in the planning of financial statement 
audits have to obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment by 
performing risk assessment procedures to be able to identify and assess the 
risks of material misstatement and also assist the auditor in planning the audit 
and exercising professional judgment and professional skepticism throughout 
the audit in determining materiality.64 For stakeholders that information is ex-
Statistiki, Oblìku ta Auditu. 3 2018, pp. 16-33; Lai, A.; Melloni, G.; Stacchezzini, R.: What does 
materiality mean to integrated reporting preparers? An empirical exploration, Meditari Ac-
countancy Research, 25(4) 2017, pp. 533-552. https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-02-2017-0113; 
Fasan, M.; Mio, C.: Fostering Stakeholder Engagement: The Role of Materiality Disclosure in 
Integrated Reporting, Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, 26(3) 2017, 
pp. 288-305
61 International Integrated Reporting Council: The International Integrated Reporting Frame-
work, 2013, [https://integratedreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/13-12-08-THE-IN-
TERNATIONAL-IR-FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
62 International Integrated Reporting Council: The International Integrated Reporting Frame-
work, 2013, [https://integratedreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/13-12-08-THE-IN-
TERNATIONAL-IR-FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
63 IASB: IFRS Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, 2018, p. 15, [https://incp.org.
co/Site/publicaciones/info/archivos/Conceptual-Framework-2018-03042018.pdf], accessed on 
04/11/2020.
64 IAASB: International Standard on Auditing 315 (Revised) Identifying and Assessing 
the Risks of Material Misstatement, 2019, A50, [https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publica-
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tremely important considering that gives significant insight into the auditor’s 
input information and considerations. It can be concluded that every stakehold-
er in interpreting financial statements should combine materiality information 
provided by the auditor in an independent auditor’s report and entity’s material 
matters disclosed in an integrated report. The statement can be corroborated 
from the integrity reporting framework perspective, “the information in the 
financial statements to serve as an anchor or point of reference to which the 
other information in an integrated report can be related”65.
Another instrument aimed to boost corporate governance is an additional re-
port to the audit committee (or supervisory board) prepared by statutory au-
ditors as a result of conducted statutory audits. Following the Regulation, next 
to the individual auditor’s report disclosed to financial statements, statutory 
auditors shall prepare an additional report with more detail and comprehen-
sive information regarding audit methodology, procedures, and results. Among 
others, they are required to publish information about the materiality concept. 
The report is available only to internal stakeholders, as audit committee or 
supervisory board members, and in the context of external stakeholders, it has 
no purpose. There is no available research regarding the information value of 
the additional report for the committee members. The FRC (2017) conducted 
survey research and found that “17% of the ACCs had neither discussed nor 
challenged the appropriateness of the level of overall materiality set by the au-
dit team”66. In the case of those ACCs that communicated materiality with au-
ditors, almost 70% of committees consider that the overall materiality level set 
by the audit team is appropriate and 6% of committee members consider that 
level was set too high. In the case of 8% of committees, the auditors did not 
share materiality information with them.67 In FRC opinion, the audit commit-
tee should not have an only supervisory role in the case of statutory auditors, 
but they should communicate and discuss the materiality level set and evaluate 
this given their knowledge of the business to determine its appropriateness, 
challenging the audit team where necessary.
tions/files/ISA-315-Full-Standard-and-Conforming-Amendments-2019-.pdf], accessed on 
13/11/2020.
65 International Integrated Reporting Council: The International Integrated Reporting Frame-
work, 2013, p. 19, [https://integratedreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/13-12-08-THE-IN-
TERNATIONAL-IR-FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
66 Financial Reporting Council: Audit Quality Thematic Review: Materiality, 2017, p. 23, 
[https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/4713123b-919c-4ed6-a7a4-869aa9a668f4/Audit-Quali-
ty-Thematic-Review-Materiality-(December-2017).pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
67 Financial Reporting Council: Audit Quality Thematic Review: Materiality, 2017, p. 23, 
[https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/4713123b-919c-4ed6-a7a4-869aa9a668f4/Audit-Quali-
ty-Thematic-Review-Materiality-(December-2017).pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
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Unlike the required elements and information of the additional report, there 
are no obligations of disclosing materiality information in the final, publicly 
accessible result of statutory audit – independent auditor’s report for public-in-
terest entities operating in Croatia. On the other side, the national Internation-
al Standards on Auditing UK (ISAs (UK)) published by Financial Reporting 
Council in the United Kingdom, which are based on the International Stan-
dards on Auditing (ISAs), requires reporting materiality details in auditors 
report. “In the UK auditors issuing extended audit opinions disclose in those 
reports the materiality adopted in their audit.”68 Considering that, auditor’s 
reports of UK companies provide a fruitful field for investigating importance 
or reporting materiality details.69 Goh & Lee (2018) investigated if the level of 
applied materiality determines earnings quality. By analyzing 432 firm-year 
observations they found that “a lower threshold of materiality level is associat-
ed with a higher earnings quality, as measured by lower discretionary accruals, 
higher accruals quality, and less earnings smoothing, and after controlling for 
auditor, industry and time fixed effects”70. Their findings are significant in the 
context of materiality concept importance for evaluating the financial position 
and business performance of companies, wherein the case of lower material 
threshold stakeholders can more rely on transparency, integrity, and objectivity 
of the information presented in financial statements. The more important ques-
tion relates to usefulness and understanding of the meaning of reported materi-
ality details by stakeholders. Related to that, Christensen et al. (2018) studied if 
reporting materiality makes difference regarding investment decisions for 246 
68 Financial Reporting Council: Audit Quality Thematic Review: Materiality, 2017, p. 9, 
[https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/4713123b-919c-4ed6-a7a4-869aa9a668f4/Audit-Quali-
ty-Thematic-Review-Materiality-(December-2017).pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
69 Related research: Iwanowicz, T.; Iwanowicz, B.: ISA 701 and Materiality Disclosure as 
Methods to Minimize the Audit Expectation Gap, J. Risk Financial Manag, 2019, 12(4), pp. 
1-20, doi: https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12040161; Goh, B. W.; Lee, K. B. J.; Li, N.; Li, D.: Are 
disclosed auditor materiality thresholds informative of firms’ earnings quality? – Evidence 
from the revised ISA 700 audit report. (2018). 41st Annual Congress of the European Ac-
counting Association, Milan, Italy, 2018 May 30-June 1. Research Collection School of Ac-
countancy; Christensen, B. E.; Eilifsen, A.; Glover, S. M.; Messier Jr, W. F.:  The Effect of 
Materiality Disclosures on Investors’ Decision Making, Accounting, Organizations and Soci-
ety, (6 September 2020, In Press, Corrected Proof) Forthcoming, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
aos.2020.101168; Hallman, N.; Schmidt, J. J.; Thompson, A.: Does Non-GAAP Reporting Re-
sult in Less Conservative Auditor Materiality Judgments? Evidence from the U.K. (March 
16, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3018823.
70 Goh, B. W.; Lee, K. B. J.; Li, N.; Li, D.: Are disclosed auditor materiality thresholds in-
formative of firms’ earnings quality? – Evidence from the revised ISA 700 audit report. (2018). 
41st Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, Milan, Italy, 2018 May 30-
June 1. Research Collection School of Accountancy, p. 25.
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UK and US investors.71 Their results show that “those participants who read 
audit reports that disclose audit materiality do not make significantly different 
investment decisions than investors who do not receive an audit materiality 
disclosure”72. Furthermore, concerning is finding that investors are more ready 
to invest in a company whose auditor’s report materiality is set at a higher 
percentage. The authors give two possible interpretations for that: “(1) inves-
tors lack a basic understanding of the inherently inverse relationship between 
audit materiality and audit precision and audit effort or (2) investors perceive 
the lower level of reported audit materiality to be a signal of increased auditee 
risk”73. The authors conclude that reporting materiality can be confusing to 
investors and that it may be helpful to disclose a more detailed explanation of 
the inverse relationship between audit materiality and audit precision in an au-
ditor’s report.74 Nevertheless, the opinion of the authors is that the information 
value of the financial statements for financially educated users is enhanced by 
disclosing materiality details. Another perspective of the reporting materiality 
was observed by Hallman (2018) who concluded that in the case of a lower 
level of applied materiality, the level of auditors’ rotation is higher.75 Further 
to this, the author concludes that lowering the rigor of the financial statement 
audit could indirectly affect investors. On the other side, results provided by 
Iwanowicz & Iwanowicz (2019) show that the implementation of the ISA 701 
that regulated disclosing key audit matters and information about materiality 
71 Christensen, B. E.; Eilifsen, A.; Glover, S. M.; Messier Jr, W. F.:  The Effect of Mate-
riality Disclosures on Investors’ Decision Making, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
(6 September 2020, In Press, Corrected Proof) Forthcoming, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
aos.2020.101168.
72 Christensen, B. E.; Eilifsen, A.; Glover, S. M.; Messier Jr, W. F.:  The Effect of Mate-
riality Disclosures on Investors’ Decision Making, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
(6 September 2020, In Press, Corrected Proof) Forthcoming, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
aos.2020.101168, p. 24.
73 Christensen, B. E.; Eilifsen, A.; Glover, S. M.; Messier Jr, W. F.:  The Effect of Mate-
riality Disclosures on Investors’ Decision Making, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
(6 September 2020, In Press, Corrected Proof) Forthcoming, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
aos.2020.101168, p. 25.
74 Christensen, B. E.; Eilifsen, A.; Glover, S. M.; Messier Jr, W. F.:  The Effect of Mate-
riality Disclosures on Investors’ Decision Making, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
(6 September 2020, In Press, Corrected Proof) Forthcoming, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
aos.2020.101168, p. 25.
75 Hallman, N.; Schmidt, J. J.; Thompson, A.: Does Non-GAAP Reporting Result in Less Con-
servative Auditor Materiality Judgments? Evidence from the U.K. (March 16, 2018). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3018823.
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limited the audit expectation gap.76 Next to 159 companies listed on the Lon-
don stock exchange, the authors analyzed the auditor’s report for 158 compa-
nies listed on the Warsaw stock exchange. Their findings confirm the premise 
that, in most cases, auditors tend to report only information that is legally 
required. In that context, all UK auditor’s reports reported materiality details 
(materiality levels, including benchmark, rates, overall materiality, and some 
of them provided information such as performance materiality), and only 9,5% 
of auditors in Poland reported materiality details.77 As opposed to that, De-
loitte’s (2017) results show that materiality details are disclosed in 48% of au-
ditor’s reports in the case of 50 Switzerland listed companies.78 Furthermore, 
PwC (2014) found that 47% (8/17) of Dutch public listed entities have disclosed 
information about materiality.79 PwC (2017) voluntary discloses “additional 
information about materiality and group scoping in the reports is provided 
on the financial statements of Singapore Exchange Limited and DBS Group 
Holdings Ltd. These additional disclosures are required in the UK but are cur-
rently not required in Singapore”80.
3.2. CHALLENGES THAT AUDITORS FACING IN DETERMINING 
MATERIALITY
Grosu et al. (2020) investigated the application of obtaining the understanding 
of the client by auditors in the case of 34 Romanian companies that are listed 
on the BVB.81 They emphasize that the applied materiality level is a result of 
76 Iwanowicz, T.; Iwanowicz, B.: ISA 701 and Materiality Disclosure as Methods to Mini-
mize the Audit Expectation Gap, J. Risk Financial Manag, 2019, 12(4), pp. 1-20, doi: https://
doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12040161.
77 Iwanowicz, T.; Iwanowicz, B.: ISA 701 and Materiality Disclosure as Methods to Mini-
mize the Audit Expectation Gap, J. Risk Financial Manag, 2019, 12(4), pp. 1-20, doi: https://
doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12040161, p. 14.
78 Deloitte: Benchmarking the new auditor’s report: Key audit matters and other addition-
al information, 2017, [https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/audit/
ch-en-audit-benchmarking-auditors-report.pdf], accessed on 29/08/2018.
79 PwC: Plain speaking! Benchmarking the new auditor’s report among Dutch listed enti-
ties, 2014, [https://www.pwc.nl/nl/assets/documents/pwc-benchmark-auditors-reporting.pdf], 
accessed on 09/11/2020.
80 PwC: Enhanced auditor’s report: Survey of first year experience in Singapore, 2017, [https://
www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/assets/enhanced-auditor-report-201709.pdf], accessed on 
10/11/2020.
81 Grosu, V.; Mateș, D.; Zlati, M.-L.; Mihaila, S.; Socoliuc, M.; Ciubotariu, M.-S.; Tanasă, S.-
M.: Econometric Model for Readjusting Significance Threshold Levels through Quick Audit 
Tests Used on Sustainable Companies, Sustainability, 2020, 12(19), pp. 1-32.
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the auditor’s professional judgment related to earnings management and the 
importance of the client, influencing audit risk, and overall audit quality.82 “The 
quality of audit in terms of discretionary revenues has worsened during the 
financial crisis as a result of the tendency for companies to refrain from dis-
closing their actual economic situation during times of financial crisis.”83 Romi 
(2017) investigated the difference in determining materiality in case of the ex-
istence of a community impact.84 The author concluded that there exist “a lack 
of clear guidelines on materiality for SRA, less scrutiny from regulators, and a 
significantly broader range of intended users to consider, impact auditor assess-
ments of materiality between financial statement and sustainability assurance 
engagements. While there is no community impact main effect, the difference 
in auditor materiality assessment is greater when there is no risk of breaching 
a contract”85. Choudhary, et al. (2019) also investigated challenges that audi-
tors facing in determining materiality.86 For research purposes, they examined 
inspection documents that the eight US largest public accounting firms during 
the period 2005-2015 submitted to the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (2,150 clients; 4,284 client-year observations). Authors found that each 
auditor of the big four audited from 15 to 20% of the observations, followed 
by Grant Thornton (12.5%), BDO (8.7%), McGladrey/RSM (4.2%), and Crowe 
(3.2%).87 “Our calculated materiality ranges are on average three to four times 
reported materiality values, suggesting that audit professionals are permitted 
and expected to exercise considerable professional judgment in determining 
materiality. We find that looser materiality amounts are positively associated 
with client financial performance and earnings volatility, while stricter judg-
82 Grosu, V.; Mateș, D.; Zlati, M.-L.; Mihaila, S.; Socoliuc, M.; Ciubotariu, M.-S.; Tanasă, S.-
M.: Econometric Model for Readjusting Significance Threshold Levels through Quick Audit 
Tests Used on Sustainable Companies, Sustainability, 2020, 12(19), p. 7.
83 Grosu, V.; Mateș, D.; Zlati, M.-L.; Mihaila, S.; Socoliuc, M.; Ciubotariu, M.-S.; Tanasă, S.-
M.: Econometric Model for Readjusting Significance Threshold Levels through Quick Audit 
Tests Used on Sustainable Companies, Sustainability, 2020, 12(19), pp. 21-22.
84 Romi, A. M.: Differences in Auditor’s Materiality Assessments When Auditing Financial 
Statements and Sustainability Reports, Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, 
37(2) 2017, pp. 149-150, DOI: 10.1080/0969160X.2017.1345799.
85 Romi, A. M.: Differences in Auditor’s Materiality Assessments When Auditing Financial 
Statements and Sustainability Reports, Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, 
37(2) 2017, pp. 149-150, DOI: 10.1080/0969160X.2017.1345799.
86 Choudhary, P.; Merkley, K.; Schipper, K.: Auditors’ Quantitative Materiality Judgments: 
Properties and Implications for Financial Reporting Reliability, Journal of Accounting Re-
search, 57(5) 2019, pp. 1303-1351.
87 Choudhary, P.; Merkley, K.; Schipper, K.: Auditors’ Quantitative Materiality Judgments: 
Properties and Implications for Financial Reporting Reliability, Journal of Accounting Re-
search, 57(5) 2019, p. 1312.
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ments are associated with contextual factors mentioned in SAB 99 and AU 
9312 such as small profits, poorer financial reporting system quality, and new 
clients.”88 “Our evidence indicates auditors do not set materiality thresholds by 
applying a simple rule of thumb; rather, materiality amounts vary in ways that 
suggest auditors are both applying judgment within their audit firms’ guidelines 
and considering contextual factors discussed in authoritative guidance.”89
3.3. THE MATERIALITY BENCHMARKS AND THRESHOLDS
The Standards do not prescribe how to and what to choose as a materiality 
benchmark in particular cases but it gives possible examples for choosing a 
benchmark. “Examples of benchmarks that may be appropriate, depending 
on the circumstances of the entity, include categories of reported income such 
as profit before tax, total revenue, gross profit, and total expenses, total equity 
or net asset value. “Profit before tax from continuing operations is often used 
for profit-oriented entities. When profit before tax from continuing operations 
is volatile, other benchmarks may be more appropriate, such as gross profit 
or total revenues.”90 To be able to choose the benchmark for determining the 
materiality level, auditors must learn and understand the client’s business and 
industry. Different stakeholders will be interested in a different perspective of 
information available from financial statements. For example, creditors will 
be interested if a company can meet its assets-based loan covenant, investors 
wonder if they should invest in the company, or shareholders are interested if 
the company is managing to operate profitable. The auditor should consider 
the main stakeholder-based by employing its professional judgment to choose 
the materiality benchmark. “In practice, of course, auditors may not know who 
all the users are or what decisions they may make based on the financial state-
ments. As a result, applying materiality in practice is a difficult professional 
judgment.”91 In determining the benchmark auditor should observe “prior pe-
88 Choudhary, P.; Merkley, K.; Schipper, K.: Auditors’ Quantitative Materiality Judgments: 
Properties and Implications for Financial Reporting Reliability, Journal of Accounting Re-
search, 57(5) 2019, p. 1306.
89 Choudhary, P.; Merkley, K.; Schipper, K.: Auditors’ Quantitative Materiality Judgments: 
Properties and Implications for Financial Reporting Reliability, Journal of Accounting Re-
search, 57(5) 2019, pp. 1306-1308.
90 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assur-
ance, and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, A4, p. 318-
319,  [https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20
Part%20I_Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
91 Arens, A., A.; Edler, R. J.; Beasley, M. S.; Hogan, C. E.: Auditing and Assurance Services: 
An Integrated Approach, 16th Edition, Pearson Education, Inc., USA, 2017, p. 234.
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riods’ financial results and financial positions, the period-to-date financial 
results and financial position, and budgets or forecasts for the current period, 
adjusted for significant changes in the circumstances of the entity”.92 Audi-
tors should be aware that using “low material threshold results in a greater 
likelihood that an error detected will be deemed as material by the auditors, 
and consequently, the more extensive audit procedures performed, combined 
with a lower tolerable misstatement, increases the likelihood of detecting 
accounting errors and these errors being corrected”.93 “Determining a per-
centage to be applied to a chosen benchmark involves the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment. There is a relationship between the percentage and the 
chosen benchmark, such that a percentage applied to profit before tax from 
continuing operations will normally be higher than a percentage applied to 
total revenue. For example, the auditor may consider five percent of profit 
before tax from continuing operations to be appropriate for a profit-oriented 
entity in the manufacturing industry, while the auditor may consider one 
percent of total revenue or total expenses to be appropriate for a not-for-profit 
entity. Higher or lower percentages, however, may be deemed appropriate in 
the circumstances.”94
The reason for not including materiality as an obligatory element of an inde-
pendent auditor’s report may be double-natured. From the one side, the ques-
tion is are auditor ready to disclose such precise information that would give 
a significant proportion of information to educated stakeholders, or from the 
other, is it that majority of stakeholders does not understand the materiality 
concept and that information would only blur information important to them. 
Neither Croatian Accounting Act, nor European legislation prescribes includ-
ing materiality details as a mandatory element of the independent auditor’s 
report. However, Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 prescribes that statutory au-
ditors carrying out statutory audits of public-interest entities shall submit an 
additional report to the audit committee of the audited entity, and among other 
92 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, A5, p. 319,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
93 Goh, B. W.; Lee, K. B. J.; Li, N.; Li, D.: Are disclosed auditor materiality thresholds in-
formative of firms’ earnings quality? – Evidence from the revised ISA 700 audit report. (2018). 
41st Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, Milan, Italy, 2018 May 30-
June 1. Research Collection School of Accountancy, p. 26.
94 IAASB: Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing Review, Other Assurance, 
and Related Services Pronouncements, 2012 Edition, Volume I, ISA 320, A7, p. 319,  [https://
www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/2012%20IAASB%20Handbook%20Part%20I_
Web.pdf], accessed on 04/11/2020.
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items, that report shall “disclose the quantitative level of materiality applied to 
perform the statutory audit for the financial statements as a whole and where 
applicable the materiality level or levels for particular classes of transactions, 
account balances or disclosures, and disclose the qualitative factors which 
were considered when setting the level of materiality”.95
Reporting materiality in an independent auditor’s report means disclosing de-
tails about the used basis for calculating preliminary materiality level, as well 
as the applied percentage and an absolute materiality value. As a materiality 
benchmark auditors most often choose profit-before-tax.96 Hallman (2018) in-
vestigated the difference between auditors that uses GAAP and non-GAAP 
financial results for the premium companies listed on the London Stock Ex-
change for the 2013-2014 fiscal years and found that more than 50% “of auditors 
who rely on ‘profit-before-tax’ as their materiality benchmark use non-GAAP 
profit before tax, which results in a less conservative audit (via a higher mate-
riality threshold) 92 percent of the time”97. “The GAAP items that auditors’ 
exclude from the materiality benchmark are highly persistent, suggesting that 
the exclusions are not typically one-time items as is often claimed.”98 Deloitte 
(2017) concluded that 84% of analyzed auditor’s reports that have disclosed 
information on materiality used profit-before-tax as a benchmark with an av-
95 Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-inter-
est entities and repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC, Article 11, 2(h), [https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0537], accessed on 04/11/2020.
96 Related research: Choudhary, P.; Merkley, K.; Schipper, K.: Auditors’ Quantitative 
Materiality Judgments: Properties and Implications for Financial Reporting Reliability, 
Journal of Accounting Research, 57(5) 2019, pp. 1303-1351; Hallman, N.; Schmidt, J. J.; 
Thompson, A.: Does Non-GAAP Reporting Result in Less Conservative Auditor Material-
ity Judgments? Evidence from the U.K. (March 16, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3018823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3018823; Financial Reporting Coun-
cil: Audit Quality Thematic Review: Materiality, 2017, p. 4, [https://www.frc.org.uk/getat-
tachment/4713123b-919c-4ed6-a7a4-869aa9a668f4/Audit-Quality-Thematic-Review-Ma-
teriality-(December-2017).pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020; Deloitte: Benchmarking the new 
auditor’s report: Key audit matters and other additional information, 2017, [https://www2.
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/audit/ch-en-audit-benchmarking-audi-
tors-report.pdf], accessed on 29/08/2018.
97 Hallman, N.; Schmidt, J. J.; Thompson, A.: Does Non-GAAP Reporting Result in Less Con-
servative Auditor Materiality Judgments? Evidence from the U.K. (March 16, 2018). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3018823.
98 Hallman, N.; Schmidt, J. J.; Thompson, A.: Does Non-GAAP Reporting Result in Less Con-
servative Auditor Materiality Judgments? Evidence from the U.K. (March 16, 2018). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3018823.
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erage threshold of 4.9%.99 “Profit before tax is considered as one of the most 
relevant financial indicator for listed companies.”100 Iwanowicz & Iwanowicz 
(2019) found that in the case of companies listed on the Warsaw stock exchange 
auditors most commonly as a materiality benchmark use profit-before-tax, 
with the most broadly used rate of 4%.101 Authors also found that a significant 
share of reports prepared by PBT, KPMG, and PwC set their threshold below 
5% meaning that “they are even more detailed and conservative”, and on the 
other side, in the case of EBITDA “Deloitte stands out from the competition 
by getting close to the upper limit of the threshold”.102 Those results show why 
auditors are not prone to disclose materiality details. Non-disclosure provides 
for auditors ability to determine a high level of materiality meaning that they 
will have to obtain less audit evidence, and to retain confidence level at high 
levels, i.e. audit risk is set at low levels. Choudhary, et al. (2019) also found 
that almost 60% of auditors use pretax income as a materiality benchmark, 
followed by revenues (less than 20%), net income (less than 10%), and assets 
(less than 5%).103 FRC (2017) found that in three analyzed years (2015-2017) 
auditors chose a profit-related benchmark in a majority of cases, but they no-
ticed an increase of audits where materiality has been based on an asset mea-
sure.104  They concluded that “the firms’ methodologies typically provide little 
or no guidance on how to calculate materiality for loss making entities and we 
have raised this with the firms”.105 An interesting finding covers the conclusion 
99 Deloitte: Benchmarking the new auditor’s report: Key audit matters and other addition-
al information, 2017, [https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/audit/
ch-en-audit-benchmarking-auditors-report.pdf], accessed on 29/08/2018.
100 Deloitte: Benchmarking the new auditor’s report: Key audit matters and other additional 
information, 2017, p. 16, [https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/au-
dit/ch-en-audit-benchmarking-auditors-report.pdf], accessed on 29/08/2018.
101 Iwanowicz, T.; Iwanowicz, B.: ISA 701 and Materiality Disclosure as Methods to Mini-
mize the Audit Expectation Gap, J. Risk Financial Manag, 2019, 12(4), pp. 1-20, doi: https://
doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12040161.
102 Iwanowicz, T.; Iwanowicz, B.: ISA 701 and Materiality Disclosure as Methods to Mini-
mize the Audit Expectation Gap, J. Risk Financial Manag, 2019, 12(4), pp. 1-20, doi: https://
doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12040161, p. 15.
103 Choudhary, P.; Merkley, K.; Schipper, K.: Auditors’ Quantitative Materiality Judgments: 
Properties and Implications for Financial Reporting Reliability, Journal of Accounting Re-
search, 57(5) 2019, p. 1306.
104 Financial Reporting Council: Audit Quality Thematic Review: Materiality, 2017, p. 10, 
[https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/4713123b-919c-4ed6-a7a4-869aa9a668f4/Audit-Quali-
ty-Thematic-Review-Materiality-(December-2017).pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
105 Financial Reporting Council: Audit Quality Thematic Review: Materiality, 2017, p. 14, 
[https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/4713123b-919c-4ed6-a7a4-869aa9a668f4/Audit-Quali-
ty-Thematic-Review-Materiality-(December-2017).pdf], accessed on 10/11/2020.
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that applied performance materiality range from 40 to 75% and clearly trivial 
thresholds from 0 to 5%. Taking all into account, materiality can be considered 
as “one of the most important decisions of the audit and thus one of the most 
valuable information for users of the financial statements”.106
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
The IAASB started a six-year-long project entitled ‘Auditors reporting’ to en-
hance the value of the independent auditor’s reports in the context of dimin-
ishing communication and information gaps. To accomplish their objective, 
they revised five and issue one new International Standard on Auditing. The 
project resulted in revolutionary changes to the structure and content of the 
report. The ISAs become effective for audits of financial statements for peri-
ods ending on or after December 15, 2016. Next to such a major change of the 
reporting ISAs, Croatian auditors had to face the implementation of European 
legislation in the following year included in the new Audit Act from 2017,107 
which affects audits for public-interest entities. Today, four years after im-
plementation, the question is, how did auditors adapted to the new reporting 
rules, and is the information value of the report enhanced. Additionally, we 
could argue, if this new, enhanced, and more informative report, after years of 
existence will become too uniform and standardized. Furthermore, are small 
auditors more inclined to provide higher-quality reports to earn clients’ trust, 
as an investment for future audits opportunities? Following the research prob-
lem, the objective of the paper is to investigate the current state and future 
perspective of the new independent auditor’s report. The question is, are Cro-
atian auditors ready to increase reporting quality by disclosing information 
regarding materiality as a significant measure of audit quality and relevant 
information for financially educated stakeholders. To investigate our premises, 
we developed four research hypotheses:
H1: There is no difference in the informative value of independent auditor’s 
reports prepared by ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors in Croatia;
H2: Auditors in Croatia are ready to disclose materiality details in independent 
auditor’s reports on a voluntary basis;
106 Deloitte: Benchmarking the new auditor’s report: Key audit matters and other additional 
information, 2017, p. 15, [https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/au-
dit/ch-en-audit-benchmarking-auditors-report.pdf], accessed on 29/08/2018.
107 Audit Act, (Official Gazette number 127/2017), [https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluz-
beni/2017_12_127_2873.html], accessed on 04/11/2020.
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H3: Croatian auditors follow European practice in choosing benchmark in au-
diting public-interest entities;
H4: Audit results available in independent auditor’s reports are related to ap-
plied materiality level.
The research covers individual auditor’s reports of Croatian public-interest en-
tities (PIEs) whose securities are listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE)108 
for the period from the first implementation of revised and new ISAs (2016) to 
the last available year (2019). Overall, we managed to gather data and analyze 
474 individual auditor’s reports (2016: 126, 2017: 130, 2018: 117, 2019: 101). On 
average over 40% examined reports refers to entities with the headquarter in 
the city of Zagreb. Followed by Central Croatia and Dalmatia with the share of 
slightly over 20% each, then Istria and Slavonia with less than 10% each. On 
the other side, over 80% of auditors covered by the research are from Zagreb.
Table 1: Structure of the statutory auditors by the number and share of pre-
pared Independent auditor’s report for public-interest entities in Croa-
tia from 2016 to 2019
2016 2017 2018 2019 Total %
Deloitte 21 26 23 19 89 19
EY 3 11 12 7 33 7
KPMG 13 13 10 11 47 10
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 30 27 24 12 93 20
‘Big Four’ 67 77 69 49 262 55
BDO Croatia 10 8 10 16 44 9
‘Big Five’ 77 85 79 65 306 65
Other statutory auditors 49 45 37 34 165 35
Total Individual Audits 126 130 116 99 471 99
Joint Audits 0 0 1 2 3 1
Total 126 130 117 101 474 100
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020.
As can be seen from the Table 1, more than 50% of all independent auditor’s 
reports are prepared by auditors from the pool ‘big four’, and adding to them 
another Croatian big player, results in an increase of share to 65% of audited 
financial statements. It can be noticed that the highest concentration of the 
108 Zagreb Stock Exchange, [https://zse.hr/], accessed on 26/08/2020.
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‘big four’ was in 2017 when they audited financial statements of almost 60% 
of all listed PIEs. Furthermore, the importance of BDO Croatia increases over 
analyzed years, and their share of audited reports increased from 6% in 2016 
to almost 16% in 2019. Prescribing mandatory rotation in the new Audit Act 
from 2017109, which is harmonized with EU auditing Regulation and Directive, 
resulted in a decrease of concentration on the Croatian audit market. On the 
other side, de-concentration is related to only one auditor but is not related to 
other statutory auditors.
Table 2: Median and total value of revenues, assets and employee number of 







Deloitte 659,546 83,193 65,507
EY 245,551 120,055 89,751
KPMG 350,965 57,882 80,049
PwC 479,949 132,665 141,144
BDO 209,087 38,128 57,864
Other 85,576 42,638 72,324
Joint Audit 38,195 8,890 14,440
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020.
Results in Table 2 show that more than 50% of PIEs audited by EY had total 
assets over 2.7 billion HRK, revenues over 737 million HRK, and employed 
more than 1,000 employees. If we exclude joint audits, it can be concluded that 
EY audited the largest listed PIEs in Croatia over the period from 2016 to 2019. 
On the other side, other ‘small’ auditors audited financial statements of the 
smallest listed PIEs in Croatia. Over the four-year-period they audited in total 
42.6 billion HRK revenues, compared to ‘big five’ that audited 431.9 billion 
HRK revenues. On the individual level, although EY audited the largest PIEs, 
the PwC audited the greatest proportion of total revenues (over 27%).
109 Audit Act, (Official Gazette number 127/2017), [https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluz-
beni/2017_12_127_2873.html], accessed on 04/11/2020.
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4.1. DIFFERENCE IN THE INFORMATIVE VALUE OF INDEPENDENT 
AUDITOR’S REPORTS PREPARED BY ‘BIG’ AND ‘SMALL’ 
AUDITORS IN CROATIA
As was elaborated in previous chapters, from the standard-setters and regula-
tors’ perspective, the quality of the independent auditor’s report can be mea-
sured by the information provided in the report. Disclosing various significant 
information on audit methodology, scope, nature of work, and detailed audit 
results, should narrow the communication gap between auditors and stake-
holders, and increase the credibility of auditor’s reports. We are stipulating 
that reports prepared by ‘small’ auditors are informative as the ones prepared 
by ‘big’ auditors. On the other side, reporting extremely important informa-
tion crucial for understanding the reach of auditor’s opinions is not prescribed 
by the Standards or other regulations. In this chapter, we will investigate if 
auditors are becoming aware of the importance of disclosed information in 
reports over the years, or they intentionally or accidentally neglecting that fact, 
and disclose the minimum required elements, and in that context, despite all 
efforts of the regulators to provide more information to stakeholders, reports 
are becoming unified and sterile.
To investigate the research problem, we grouped auditors by the number of 
conducted audits and the size of the PIEs. The determinants of the size are 
total assets, revenues, and employee number. The size proxy is obtained by 
principal component analysis. Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) test shows that the 
sampling adequacy for each variable used for calculating size proxy is ac-
ceptable (.624), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity with the p-value .000 confirms 
that data can be processed with factor analysis. The first component of the 
PCA explains 71.867% of the variance. In the next phase, we calculated the 
average value of the size proxy per the statutory auditor included in the re-
search. Although there is no difference in results, three cases of the joint audit 
are excluded from the cluster analysis, and one auditor is excluded because of 
missing data. Finally, 50 auditors are included in the analysis. To identify rel-
atively homogeneous groups of cases based on chosen characteristics (number 
of conducted audits and PIEs size), we used hierarchical cluster analysis. All 
tested methods (nearest neighbor, Ward’s method, between-groups linkage) by 
applying squared Euclidean distance resulted in three clusters. Opposed to 
that, Euclidean distance resulted in more clusters, which is not interesting in 
the context of this research. Results of the hierarchical cluster analysis benefit 
us for using k-means cluster analysis to obtain final clustering results.
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Table 3: ANOVA table for the k-means cluster analysis
Cluster Error
F Sig.Mean Square df Mean Square df
Number of audits 9026.907 2 10.340 47 873.032 .000
PIEs size proxy .983 2 .073 47 13.490 .000
The F tests should be used only for descriptive purposes because the clusters 
have been chosen to maximize the differences among cases in different clusters. 
The observed significance levels are not corrected for this and thus cannot be 
interpreted as tests of the hypothesis that the cluster means are equal.
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
The results presented in the ANOVA table (Table 3) show that both charac-
teristics used for clustering the auditors are important in the cluster analysis 
(p-value < .05). However, considering higher F-value numbers of conducted 
audits had a higher impact compared to the size proxy for assigning to one of 
the three clusters. These results differ from the results obtained in the research 
conducted two years ago where cluster analysis resulted in two clusters where 
one included the ‘big four’ and BDO, and other all other auditors.110
Table 4: Number of Cases in each Cluster and structure of the clusters
Group Auditors Number of auditors
Number of 
audits % of audits
1 PwC, Deloitte 2.000 182 38.40
2 EY, KPMG, BDO 3.000 124 26.16
3 Others 45.000 165 34.81
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
The deciding characteristic in classifying PwC and Deloitte into a separate 
group is the number of conducted audits over the four-year-period. Overall, they 
prepared 182 or 38% of all analyzed independent auditor’s reports. For further 
research purposes, we merged the first and second groups into a single group of 
‘big’ auditors. Also, we added joint audits to the group of ‘big’ auditors.
110 Tušek, B.; Ježovita, A.: The Key Audit Matters as an Element of the Independent Au-
ditor’s Report – a Booster to the Corporate Governance. InterEULawEast: journal for the 
international and european law, economics and market integrations, 2018, 5(2), pp. 241-276. 
doi:10.22598/iele.2018.5.2.9, p. 260.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics on the number of pages, continuous engagement 
period and number of published key audit matters for listed PIE (2017-
2019) group by auditors’ size
Number of pages Continuous engagement period Number of KAM
MED AVG SD MED AVG SD MED AVG SD
Big auditors 6 6.11 1.15 3 4.45 4.11 1 1.5 0.85
Small auditors 5 5.38 1.34 3 5.56 6.52 1 1.26 0.86
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
Results show that more than 50% of reports prepared by ‘big’ auditors have 6 
and more pages, which is one page more compared to ‘small’ auditors (Table 
5). On the other side, both groups have the same median value of the continu-
ous engagement period, but ‘small’ auditors have a longer period of continuous 
engagement with 5.56 years on average with a significant standard deviation 
of 6.52 years. The result indicates dispersion in the duration of the continuous 
engagement period. The maximum continuous period for ‘small’ auditors was 
27 years and for ‘big’ auditors 23 years. Furthermore, 22 reports audited by 
‘small’ auditors, and 25 reports audited by ‘big’ auditors, show a continuous 
engagement period longer than 10 years.























2017 5.17 130 27 24 10 20 6 6 3 29
2018 4.97 117 26 18 19 6 16 4 4 21
2019 4.31 101 30 22 10 7 3 11 2 12
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
The average duration of continuous engagement declines over the years. The 
information is important from the aspect of the required rotation period pre-
scribed by the Croatian Audit Act from 2017. The same auditor may conduct a 
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statutory audit for the same PIE for a maximum of 7 years including the year 
of initial engagement.111 In accordance with the Regulation (EU), No 537/2014 
maximum duration can be extended to 20 years, and on an exceptional ba-
sis, additional engagement shall not exceed two more years. In any case, after 
breaking the engagement, the statutory auditor shall not undertake the stat-
utory audit of the same public-interest entity within the following four-year 
period.112 As observed by the years, the share of initial engagements increases. 
In 2019, in 30% of auditor’s reports auditor was initially engaged, compared 
to 2017 where that was 21%. Conducted tests show that there is no statistical-
ly significant difference in duration of engagement period between ‘big’ and 
‘small’ auditors.









Mann-Whitney U 17742.500 12537.000 21872.000
Wilcoxon W 31272.500 18978.000 35402.000
Z -5.587 -.342 -2.716
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .732 .007
a. Grouping Variable: 2group of auditors_code
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
Results of the Mann-Whitney U test (Table 7) shows that the distribution of 
the number of pages in independent auditor’s reports prepared by ‘big’ auditors 
and ‘small’ auditors is not the same (p-value is .000), which lead us to the con-
clusion that ‘big’ auditors provide more information in their reports compared 
to ‘small’ auditors. Furthermore, according to obtained results ‘big’ auditors 
disclose more key audit matter compared to ‘small’ auditors (p-value .000). 
Next to the fact that ‘small’ auditors on average reported a lesser number of 
key audit matters, 18.5% of them did not include key audit matter paragraph in 
111 Audit Act, (Official Gazette number 127/2017), Article 64, [https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/
clanci/sluzbeni/2017_12_127_2873.html], accessed on 04/11/2020.
112 Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-in-
terest entities and repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC, Article 17, [https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0537], accessed on 04/11/2020.
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the report or did disclose the statement “We have determined that there are no 
key audit matters to report”, or “Except for the matter described in the Basis 
for Qualified Opinion section we have determined that there are no key audit 
matters to report”. The positive information is that more than 50% of non-
KAM reports are from the first implementation year, 2016.
Table 8: Frequencies of issued opinions between ‘big auditors’ and ‘small audi-






Adverse Opinion 0 3 Mann-Whitney U 23406.5
Disclaimer of Opinion 1 1 Wilcoxon W 71611.5
Qualified Opinion 82 52 Z -1.796
Unmodified opinion 227 108 Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.072
Total 310 164 a Grouping Variable: 2group of auditors_code
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
The differences between ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors also can be view by analyz-
ing issued opinion in independent auditor’s reports (Table 8). The first results 
of frequencies show that ‘small’ auditors are more prone to express a modified 
opinion. Most often, they issued a qualified opinion (31.7%). Furthermore, the 
only three adverse opinions from the sample are issued by the ‘small’ auditors. 
Nevertheless, the results of the Mann-Whitney U test show that there is no 
statistically significant difference in issued opinion distributions between ‘big’ 
and ‘small’ auditors (p-value .072).
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for number of reasons for modifying opinion be-
tween ‘big auditors’ and ‘small auditors’
Mean Standard Deviation Median Mode Minimum Maximum
Big auditors 2.1 1.37 2 1 1 8
Small auditors 1.96 1.16 2 1 1 6
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
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Although ‘small’ auditors issued more modified opinions, on average ‘big’ 
auditors provided more reasons for the modification. Differences are notable 
only in the value of the arithmetic mean, but not in median and mode results 
(Table 9). The difference between ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors is not significant 
what is confirmed by the Mann-Whitney U test (p-value is .741).
Table 10: Results of significant going concern disclosure in auditor’s reports in 
Croatia
Significant going concern 
disclosure Other matter paragraph
No Yes Yes % No Yes Yes %
Big auditors 254 56 18.06 231 79 25.48
Small auditors 144 20 12.20 81 83 50.61
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
By analyzing differences in disclosing information in the paragraph regarding 
going concern assumption, it can be noted that 18% of ‘big’ auditors and 12% 
of ‘small’ auditors expressed their opinion regarding going concern assump-
tion (Table 10).  Nevertheless, the difference in distributions between ‘big’ and 
‘small’ auditors is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U test p-value 
is .098).
Table 11: Differences in the informative value of auditor’s report between ‘big’ 
and ‘small’ statutory auditors in Croatia (2016-2017)
Big auditors vs. 
small auditors
p-value for the 
Mann-Whitney 
U test
Number of pages Difference .000
Continuous engagement period No difference .732
Number of KAM Difference .007
Opinion No difference .072
Reasons for modifying opinion No difference .741
going concern disclosure No difference .098
Other matter paragraph Difference .000
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
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Considering all together, certain differences between independent auditor’s re-
ports prepared by ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors exist (Table 11). Differences arise 
in the number of pages, reported key audit matters, and inclusion of other 
matter paragraphs. On the other side, there is no difference in the duration of 
the continuous engagement period, frequency in reporting modified opinion, 
and the number of reasons for opinion modification. Furthermore, there is no 
statistically significant difference in disclosing information regarding going 
concern assumption. Putting differences on the one, and similarities on the 
other side, we are concluding that the information value of independent audi-
tor’s reports prepared by ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors for Croatian listed PIEs in 
the period from 2016 to 2019 is the same, and by that, we are accepting our 
first research hypothesis (H1).
4.2. REPORTING MATERIALITY DETAILS IN INDEPENDENT 
AUDITOR’S REPORTS
Stakeholders must use materiality and audit risk information to be able to read 
the auditor’s report correctly and comprehensively. From the aspect of the in-
vestor, it should not be the same if the tolerable misstatements in financial 
statements are 1 or 7 million HRK, or if auditors provide the level of rea-
sonable assurance of 85 or 95%. The first step in that direction is to disclose 
materiality details in independent auditor’s reports.
Table 12: Reporting materiality in independent auditor’s reports of PIEs in 
Croatia (2016-2019)
2016 2017 2018 2019 Total %
No 96 64 58 50 268 56.54
Yes 30 66 59 51 206 43.46
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
Out of 474 analyzed independent auditor’s reports for the four-year-period, 
more than half of them do not disclose materiality details (Table 12). The main 
reason for such a result is the first year of implementation of the revised and 
new ISAs where even 76% of reports did not have disclosed information re-
garding materiality details. In the next year, the share of reports that includes 
materiality details reached 50% and stayed at that level over the following 
years.
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Although over the years it can be noticed the increase of auditors that provide 
materiality details in their reports, few big players are stubborn, and they dis-
close minimum of the required information. Results of studies conducted for 
the entities listed on the UK security market, where reporting materiality is 
required, show that just those auditors are using the highest level of tolerable 
misstatements, implying lower audit quality.
Table 13: Reporting materiality in independent auditor’s reports of PIEs in 
Croatia (2016-2019) by auditors’ groups
Reporting materiality No Yes Total
n % n %
Big auditors 182 58.7 128 41.29 310
Small auditors 86 52.4 78 47.56 164
Total 268 56.5 206 43.46 474
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
In the first group of the ‘big’ auditors can be noticed that almost 60% of au-
ditors disclose materiality details in independent auditor’s reports (Table 14). 
In that group, only two statutory auditors disclose given information, and three 
of them never disclosed materiality details in their reports. Taking altogether 
into account, the situation with ‘small auditors’ is better. Over 47% of reports 
prepared by small auditors disclose materiality information. Furthermore, out 
of 49 ‘small’ auditors, 28 or 57% of them disclosed materiality details in their 
reports. Additionally, one auditor, in three reports, disclosed information about 
performance materiality. Nevertheless, the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant (Mann-Whitney U test p-value .191). Considering all we can accept our sec-
ond research hypothesis that statutory auditors in Croatia are ready to disclose 
materiality details in independent auditor’s reports on voluntary basis (H2).
Table 14: Materiality amounts reported in the independent auditor’s reports by 
chosen benchmark
Materiality 
benchmark n % n Mean
Standard 
Deviation Median
Assets 31 15.05 14,147,827 60,544,860 2,055,431
Earnings 38 18.45 21,944,421 25,614,223 11,700,000
Equity 1 0.49 7,550,000 . 7,550,000
Revenues 136 66.02 8,139,576 10,578,611 3,820,000
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
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In the literature review section of the paper, we found that the most often used 
materiality benchmark by auditors in the EU, UK, and the USA is a prof-
it-before-tax. Over the four-year-period, in only 18% of reports for Croatian 
listed PIEs that disclosed materiality details, auditors choose earnings as a 
benchmark, and the majority of them, over 65%, chose revenues (Table 14). 
The materiality amount always must be observed together with the materiality 
percentage, but at this point, it can be noticed that in the case where bench-
marks are assets or revenues, the materiality amount is lower compared to 
reports where the benchmark was earnings. That could lead us to the conclu-
sion that auditors of small companies rather choose revenues as a materiality 
benchmark.
Table 15: Materiality amounts reported in the independent auditor’s reports by 
chosen benchmarks and auditors group
Count Mean Standard Deviation Median
Assets Big auditors 8 48,053,330 118,023,620 7,975,000Small auditors 22 2,452,286 1,732,657 1,700,000
Earnings Big auditors 26 28,111,615 27,795,410 16,523,500Small auditors 11 6,426,000 11,024,910 550,000
Revenues Big auditors 91 10,022,813 11,939,932 4,796,000Small auditors 45 4,331,251 5,438,663 1,400,000
Equity Big auditors 1 7,550,000 . 7,550,000Small auditors 0 0 0 0
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
The more detailed results (Table 15) show that the only difference in choosing 
a benchmark in the case of ‘small’ compared to ‘big’ auditors are related to 
assets. Additionally, ‘big’ auditors audited the largest PIEs, as shown earlier, 
and in that context, it is expected that the absolute value of materiality is higher 
in the case of ‘big’ auditors. Putting aside a benchmark, correlation analysis 
for every observation shows the significant positive correlation of materiality 
amount with the value of PIEs’ assets (.839, significant at the 0.01 level), and 
then revenues (.674, significant at the 0.01 level). The difference in materi-
ality amount reported by ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors is statistically significant 
(Mann-Whitney U test p-value .000).
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Mean Standard Deviation Mode Median Maximum Minimum
Assets 1.20 0.58 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.50
Earnings 5.76 2.47 5.00 5.00 10.00 2.50
Equity 4.50 . 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
Revenues 1.40 0.73 1.00 1.00 5.00 0.05
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
Results of descriptive statistics show that the most commonly applied percent-
ages of materiality by Croatian auditors are at the same level as worldwide 
practices. When using earnings as a materiality benchmark, most often they 
set it at a level of 5%. The average materiality percentage was 5.76% with a 
standard deviation of 2.47%. The maximum percentage for earnings as a ma-
teriality benchmark was 10% and a minimum of 2.5%. The revenues are most 
often materiality benchmark for Croatian statutory auditors, with an average 
percentage of 1.40% and a standard deviation of 0.73%. The most commonly 
used percentage for the revenues was 1%.
Table 17 Differences in materiality percentages reported in the independent 
auditor’s reports by chosen benchmarks and auditors’ size
Materiality base / 
auditors size
Materiality percentage






Big auditors 9 1.48 0.66 1 .90a 0.9 2.6
Small 
auditors 22 1.09 0.51 1 1 0.5 3
Earnings
Big auditors 27 4.81 1.77 5 5 2.5 9
Small 
auditor 11 8.09 2.47 10 10 5 10
Equity Big auditors 1 4.5 . 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Revenues
Big auditors 91 1.37 0.65 1 1 0.7 3
Small 
auditors 45 1.48 0.88 1.3 1 0.05 5
a Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
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Results indicate that ‘big’ auditors prefer earnings as a benchmark, and ‘small’ 
auditors prefer assets. Nevertheless, Croatian auditors most often apply reve-
nues as a materiality benchmark. For all benchmarks, except assets, ‘small’ au-
ditors set a higher percentage compared to ‘big’ auditors, which implies higher 
audit quality of ‘big’ compared to ‘small’ auditors. Nevertheless, differences 
between ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors are not statistically significant (Mann-Whit-
ney U test p-value .565). Unlike European, UK, and USA practice, auditors in 
Croatia most often choose revenues as a materiality benchmark, by which we 
reject our third research hypothesis that Croatian auditors follow European 
practice in choosing a benchmark in auditing public-interest entities.
In the last part of the research, we investigated auditors that disclosed infor-
mation on materiality details in an independent auditor’s report. Our prem-
ise is that a lower materiality percentage and amount are in direct relation 
with higher audit quality. In that context, we assumed that auditors, who 
determined materiality percentage and amount at a lower level in more cas-
es issued a modified opinion, emphasized other matters, or going concern 
assumption. As it was found earlier, 206 or 43.46% of independent auditor’s 
report had disclosed details on materiality. Out of 205 registered audit com-
panies in Croatia113 52 of them conducted statutory audits for listed PIEs 
over the four-year-period, and 23 or 44.23% of statutory auditors included in 
the research never disclosed materiality details in the independent auditor’s 
reports. The largest of them are Deloitte, KPMG, and EY. Considering that, 
the final part of the research covers 29 or 55.77% of auditors that disclosed 
materiality details in their reports.
By applying multiple regression analysis, we tested three assumptions. The 
assumptions are that dependent variables (modified opinion, emphasized 
other matters, and going concern assumption) are negatively related to in-
dependent variables (materiality percentage and materiality amount scaled 
by revenues). Obtained models do not result in a high coefficient of deter-
mination but are significant in finding the relationship between audit results 
and applied materiality levels. The low R-square, if the model is significant, 
could mean that despite noisy and variable data, we could find a trend that 
indicates that independent variables still provide information about the de-
pendent variable.
113 Ministry of Finance: Registry of Auditors, [http://rgfi.fina.hr/RegistarRevizora], accessed 
on: 13/11/2020.
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Table 18: Multiple regression analysis – overall model results
Model Dependent variable R R2 Durbin-Watson F Sig.
1 Modification of opinion .172 .030 1.634 3.060 .049
2 Other Matter Paragraph .166 .027 1.820 2.819 .062
3 Going concern .210 .044 1.643 4.610 .011
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
 
Durbin-Watson test in the range of 1.5 to 2.5 is acceptable, and by that, we 
can conclude that there is no autocorrelation problem (Table 18). Furthermore, 
variance inflation factors (VIF) at the level of 1.004 confirms to us that there 
is no multicollinearity problem with our data. Two of three of our models can 
be interpreted as statistically significant at the significance level of 5%. If we 
accept a significance level of 10% the third model also can be accepted. Nev-
ertheless, the idea of the models was to detect the existence and direction of 
the relationship.






1 Modification of opinion
Materiality 
percentage -.031 -.146 .038
Materiality 
amount .274 .083 .234
2 Other Matter Paragraph
Materiality 
percentage .002 .010 .891
Materiality 
amount .552 .166 .019
3 Going concern
Materiality 
percentage -.035 -.188 .007
Materiality 
amount -.301 -.106 .127
Source: prepared by authors’ using publicly disclosed data available at the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange web, [www.zse.hr], accessed on 20/09/2020
Obtained results confirm us relationship between materiality level and chosen 
elements regarding audit results available in independent auditor’s reports. As 
we expected, modification of the auditor’s opinion is statistically significant 
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negatively related to the applied percentage of materiality. If the auditor decreas-
es the used materiality percentage, the likelihood of issuing modified opinion 
increases. The same conclusion can be made in case of including going concern 
paragraph in auditor’s reports. In the latter case, the significance is even more 
emphasized. It is interesting to notice that modified opinion or going concern 
is not related to materiality amount, unlike other matter paragraph, which is 
influenced by materiality amount, but not with percentage. Considering results, 
we can conclude that audit results are related to the applied materiality level by 
which we can accept our fourth research hypothesis (H4).
5. CONCLUSION
Next to the risk of material misstatement, the materiality concept is one of the 
most important concepts in the audit process. Understanding those concepts 
significantly helps external stakeholders in reading and evaluating audited 
financial statements. Those concepts give stakeholders insight into auditors’ 
approaches to financial statements audits. If material misstatement and audit 
risk are set at a lower level, the auditor shall obtain more audit evidence to 
issue an opinion. Obtaining more audit evidence leads to greater audit quality. 
The materiality concept provides stakeholder’s information of acceptable ma-
terial misstatements ensuring that audited financial statements do not contain 
non-tolerable misstatements, above-disclosed amount, in case of unmodified 
auditor’s opinion. The information can be directly related to analyzed results 
and should help stakeholders in making a business decision. The results of our 
research show that the majority of statutory auditors in Croatia are ready to 
disclose materiality details in an independent auditor’s report. More than 55% 
of auditor’s reports for listed PIEs prepared by statutory auditors in the period 
from 2016 to 2019 have disclosed materiality details. There is no difference in 
disclosing materiality information between ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors in Cro-
atia. Unlike, other countries analyzed in the paper (EU, UK, USA) that prefer 
to use profit-before-tax as a materiality benchmark, Croatian auditors prefer a 
revenue-based benchmark with an average percentage of 1.40%. Finally, we 
found that in case of used lower materiality percentages auditors more often 
expressed modified opinion and included going concern paragraph in the re-
port. That could lead to the conclusion that auditors are more cautious and take 
the audit process more seriously if they in the preliminary phase of the audit 
process determine inherent and control risks at higher levels, which leads to 
lower materiality levels. We also found that several ‘big’ auditors in Croatia are 
not ready to disclose materiality details in their reports and increase its infor-
mation value. Considering the information value and communication gap we 
additionally analyze the structure and content of the new independent auditor’s 
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report prepared in accordance with revised and new ISAs as well in accordance 
with Croatian and EU legislation. In that context, we concluded that Croatian 
auditors adapted to changes in two waves. Firstly, in the first year of the revised 
and new Standards application, 20% of reports did not have disclosed key au-
dit matters, which represents the most significant novelty of the report. In the 
following year, that share was slightly over 6%, but in that year, the auditor had 
a problem with disclosing information about appointment date and continuous 
engagement period duration. Over 20% of auditors did not disclose informa-
tion or they disclosed information about the year of the first appointment, and 
2.3% of them did not disclose information on the continuous engagement peri-
od. Problem with disclosing information about appointment date until the last 
analyzed years, but it can be concluded that auditors have complied with other 
requirements by the Audit Act and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014. Furthermore, 
we concluded that there is no difference in the informative value of independent 
auditor’s reports for listed PIEs prepared by ‘big’ and ‘small’ auditors. Finally, 
we can conclude that the information value of the independent auditor’s report 
significantly increased by the implementation of revised and new ISAs and the 
new legislation. But, on the descriptive level, we found that, with years, used 
sentences and formulations become uniform. The pattern is recognized in re-
ports of one auditor, but also in reports between different auditors. We are not 
arguing that standardization is something negative, we are encourage it, but also, 
we advocate the inclusion of more ‘personalized’ audit-related entity-specific 
information as materiality details in independent auditor’s report.
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